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A Compleat Jurist
ROBERT MacCRATE*
Pace Law School has been most fortunate in its formative
years to experience the guiding hand of Justice James D. Hop-
kins. With his retirement from judicial service at the end of
1981, the courts of New York lost a uniquely compleat jurist. A
man of uncommon versatility and talent, he enriched the appel-
late division, second department with the multiple dimensions
of his life in the law. His public services spanned over 40 years
in all three branches of government, at the town, county and
state level, giving this naturally reflective, perceptive and inquir-
ing scholar a rich resource of personal observation and experi-
ence upon which to draw and to share with his colleagues in the
work of the court.
I. Philosophy and the Law
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."
The contributions of Justice Hopkins in his pithy opinions,
his insightful articles, his teaching of other judges and his in-
struction of the bar set him apart. Together they reflect a master
of the judicial role who, with a coherent philosophy of the law,
thoroughly understood its ultimate dimensions as they relate to
the individual, to responsible government, to the distribution of
governmental powers, to the institution of justice and its
process.
Justice Hopkins regarded it as essential to an understanding
and proper development of the law to step back periodically and
to examine the law as "a function of our culture."" In 1964 he
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cogently encouraged practitioners to give attention to the philos-
ophy of the law:
I know that we, as lawyers, have somewhat of a resistance to
philosophy. We are more attached to decisions and precedents
than to a philosophy of law. It is the current result, rather than
the preceding evolution of principle, that holds our attention, be-
cause our livelihood is involved in concrete cases, not in abstrac-
tions. But, of course, we lawyers must also be interested in princi-
ple, for otherwise the entire fabric of our common law tradition
loses its meaning. If we cannot explain the decision of a case
based on a reason applicable to all similarly situated, we return to
the caprice of the caliph who adminsters justice on the steps of
the mosque.3
The continuing search in each decision for the "reason ap-
plicable to all similarly situated" characterized Justice Hopkins'
contributions to the law in its various dimensions, as a sampling
of his writings confirms. Justice Hopkins recognized the role of
the law in the resolution of basic social and economic issues. He
reflected and wrote upon the law's direction, and the intellectual
and cultural forces which lent the impetus to that movement, in
a manner that not only placed law in its full setting but intro-
duced a "greater perspective" into the lawyer's counseling, the
judge's decision making and the calling of the law itself. 4
He was particularly struck by the seminal contribution of
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to the path taken by the law - a
path that Justice Hopkins retraced in his remarkable address to
the Brooklyn Bar Association in 1964.1 He pointed to the fer-
ment in thought that surrounded Holmes in his developing
years, affected by Darwin and Huxley and the portents of the
scientific method.' He appraised Holmes as "a great man be-
cause he seized the philosophy of his time, foresaw its implica-
tions in the future, and applied those implications to the law."'7
For Justice Hopkins, Holmes strikingly demonstrated his fore-
42 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as A Century in the Law].
3. Hopkins, "The Path of the Law" Retraced, 41 BROOKLYN BARRISTER 205, 205-06
(1964) [hereinafter referred to as "The Path of the Law" Retraced].
4. Id. at 212.
5. See id. at 205-12.
6. Id. at 212.
7. Id.
[Vol. 3:593
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/11
A COMPLEAT JURIST
sight when he said in an 1890's address:
For the rational study of the law the black letter man may be the
man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of sta-
tistics and the master of economics.*
He attributes to Holmes "clear vision that in the future the so-
cial sciences - sociology, economics, political science - would
have an increasingly important role in the process of legal
decision."
Justice Hopkins proceeded (both in his 1964 address and
eight years later for the Brooklyn Bar's centennial) to trace the
path of the law through "the Brandeis brief" and the ensuing
use of economists' studies of markets and competition, sociolo-
gists' explorations of the effects of racial segregation and politi-
cal scientists' appraisals of the proportionality of representation,
down into his own years on the bench. He found one of the guid-
ing precepts of the modern era to be that law should conform to
the realities of the world in which we live. He noted the "insis-
tence in the investigation and the accurate recording of things as
they are" rather than as imagined. 10 Facts must first be known
before a legal rule is determined.
In this detailed attention to the factual background for each
new development in the law, Justice Hopkins found "the final
recognition of the basic thought that courts do make law, and
the process should be consciously accompanied by a knowledge
of what present conditions are and how they will be affected by
the implications of the rule adopted."11
He assigned a special importance to the modern intellectual
climate in its impact upon the law. He found common well-
springs for a diverse array of developments in the law in the in-
tellectual contributions of Freud in his theories of sexual repres-
sion and of Einstein with his insights into relativity. He
expressed his thesis in this way:
[TJhat law is a function of our culture, that the philosophies and
the scientific advancements of the times influence the movement
8. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
9. See "The Path of the Law" Retraced, supra note 3, at 209.
10. See A Century in the Law, supra note 2, at 43.
11. Id.
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of the law, just as they affect our customs and habits and
institutions."2
Thus he came to see a common source in the theories of
Freud for the law's changing attitude toward censorship, the re-
vision of divorce law and new approaches to the penal law." The
law's growing insistence upon the weighing of competing inter-
ests, as, for example, in zoning matters and constitutional issues,
and the accompanying refusal to apply inflexibly absolute prin-
ciples, he regarded as a cultural manifestation of Einstein's
treatment of relatives.
Speaking as an anthropologist, Justice Hopkins saw in the
total environment - with the increased tempo of life and the
shortening of space and time - the origins of each of the follow-
ing: the changing rule for choice of law ("contacts come closer to
meeting the demands" of modern society);1 4 the destruction of
the "citadel of privity" (its significance lost as product distribu-
tion spread to even wider markets at an ever faster pace); 15 en-
tertaining lawsuits far from the residence of a party (distance no
longer viewed as seriously prejudicial);"6 limitations on the right
to recover for libel (ease of communication was "an unexpressed
motivation");17 and expansive rules of tort liability (fright as a
ground for recovery, the time when a claim for medical malprac-
tice arises, the abolition of intrafamily tort immunity for non-
willful torts, liability to bystanders)."8
There can be little doubt that Justice Hopkins found the
legal environment of his time congenial to his own instincts and
approach to judging, as reflected in his 1972 statement to the
Brooklyn Bar:
The law is ceaselessly churning between certainty and
change, between precedent and reversal .... If the landmarks of
the past seem to be one by one destroyed by a rising tide today
that at times is frightening because of its force and breadth, we
must recall that this is the heritage of life, that creation is the
12. Id. at 42.
13. Id. at 45-46.
14. Id. at 47.
15. See "The Path of the Law" Retraced, supra note 3, at 208.
16. See A Century in the Law, supra note 2, at 47.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 46.
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process of making better, of selection, and of tearing down to
rebuild.19
II. Justice Hopkins' Opinions
In his opinions addressing important public issues, such as
discrimination based on sex and the permissible methods for
financing free public education, to which specific reference is
later made,20 Justice Hopkins wrote with an awareness of the
cultural forces at work and of the directions in which the law
was moving. He approached what he referred to as the "process
in the making of the judgment" as the responsibility "to decide
what must be preserved and what must be abandoned, to recon-
cile the liberty to change with the constant values which must
not be changed.""
A. Equality and the Law
The evolution of the concept of equality in the law, from
that of "equivalence" in Plessy v. Ferguson"2 to that of antidis-
crimination in Brown v. Board of Education 2 and on to some-
thing more, had attracted Justice Hopkins in his overview of A
Century in the Law. He perceived in this evolution a freeing of
equality from its linkage to status and noted the growing insis-
tence upon "a rational foundation for the denial of equal treat-
ment" and refusal to accept differences as a characteristic of sta-
tus. He perceived this "levelling of the difference in rights
arising out of status" not only in the closer identity between
man and woman, but in the law's changing treatment of aliens,
convicts, indentured servants, infants and incompetents. Noting
that Sir Henry Maine at an earlier time had declared that the
direction of the common law had been from status to contract,
he suggested that the more recent direction of the common law
might be said to move "from status to contract toward
19. Id. at 47.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 31-34.
21. See A Century in the Law, supra note 2, at 47.
22. 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) (commonly referred to as the "Separate but Equal"
Case).
23. 347 U.S. 483, 485-96 (1954).
1983]
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equality. '"2 4
In East Williston,"6 an opinion that reflected his prior ex-
ploration of the evolution of the concept of equality, Justice
Hopkins upheld the right of women to have pregnancy treated
no less liberally than other physical conditions to which human
beings are subject. Gender being neutralized by statute as a
source of differentiation, for him it naturally followed that preg-
nancy so far as possible should be treated on a parity with other
physical incapacity. The opinion pointed out that while in a
sense the equal protection clause deals with classes of people,
"the Human Rights Law deals in contrast with individuals" and
"prevents disparate treatment of individuals."2
B. Responsible Government
From his background in the administration of local govern-
ment, Justice Hopkins brought to the bench an acute concern
with how government treats the individual citizen and how the
law protects the individual from arbitrary actions. This led him
to insist on the right to a simple hearing before any discharge
even in the face of what a majority of his court felt were open
and shut grounds for dismissal. To him, every village employee
should have an opportunity to state why his or her separation
from public service should not be directed.27 By the same token,
once the state had insinuated itself into a challenged activity
"the requirements of due process must be met," as when the
State Racing Association denied track facilities to a horse
trainer.26
His writings reflect an abiding sense of the importance of
responsible government and the courts' role in assuring it. At
the same time, Justice Hopkins, with his singular overview of
24. See A Century in the Law, supra note 2, at 45.
25. Board of Educ. (East Williston) v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 42
A.D.2d 49, 52-53, 345 N.Y.S.2d 93, 97-98 (2d Dep't 1973), affd, 35 N.Y.2d 673, 319
N.E.2d 202, 360 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1974).
26. Id. at 97-98.
27. Economico v. Village of Pelham, 67 A.D.2d 272, 280, 415 N.Y.S.2d 239, 245 (2d
Dep't 1979) (Hopkins, J., dissenting), aff'd, 50 N.Y.2d 120, 405 N.E.2d 694, 428 N.Y.S.2d
213 (1980).
28. Jacobson v. New York Racing Ass'n, 41 A.D.2d 87, 90, 341 N.Y.S.2d 333, 337 (2d
Dep't), modified, 33 N.Y.2d 144, 305 N.E.2d 765, 350 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1973).
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the process of governing, recognized that effective government at
times required independence from public second-guessing. In
determining that a public officer was immune from suit at the
hand of a private citizen for the result of his discretionary or
quasi-judicial acts, he observed:
In weighing the balance between the effects of oppressive ac-
tion and vindictive or retaliatory damage suits against the officer,
we think that the public interest in prompt and fearless determi-
nations by the officer, based on his interpretations of the law and
the facts before him, must take precedence. A public officer,
haunted by the spector of a lawsuit, may well be subject to the
twin tendencies of procrastination and compromise to the detri-
ment of the proper performance of his duties.2
The court of appeals affirmed, "for the reasons stated in the
opinion of the Appellate Divison. ' ' 8
C. Law Making and the Law
While rejecting the argument that the equal protection
clause as interpreted most recently by the United States Su-
preme Court had been violated, Justice Hopkins' eloquent sepa-
rate opinion in the Levittown school financing case contained a
compelling indictment (which the majority in the court of ap-
peals chose to ignore) of opportunitistic government that ignores
constitutional mandates in order to "satisfy the conflicting de-
mands of constituents."'81 He found in the Education Article of
the State Constitutions2 a firm mandate that "State support of
free public schools for all children was to be provided by the
Legislature according to a system. '3 3 He found that a uniform
29. Rottkamp v. Young, 21 A.D.2d 373, 376, 249 N.Y.S.2d 330, 334 (2d Dep't 1964),
aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 831, 205 N.E.2d 866, 257 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1965).
30. Rottkamp v. Young, 15 N.Y.2d 831, 833, 205 N.E.2d 866, 866, 257 N.Y.S.2d 944,
944 (1965).
31. Board of Educ. (Levittown) v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d 217, 267-68, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843,
873-74 (2d Dep't 1981) (Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), modified,
57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982).
32. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1, which provides, "[t]he legislature shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of
this state may be educated."
33. Board of Educ. (Levittown) v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d at 267, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 874
(Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
1983]
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and harmonious system of grants had in fact been conceived in
the 19th century and implemented for many years, but that
more recently the Legislature had enacted a host of "special
laws reaching a level of complexity so as to negate the existence
of a basic State-wide fiscal system for education" and that flat
grants and hold harmless formulas had rendered the plan of
school finance "a perversion of the constitutional mandate for a
system," that the 1978 amendments converted past complexities
"into a veritable jungle of labyrinthine incongruity" and "that a
constitutional system no longer exists."' 4 Drawing upon Homer,
Justice Hopkins delivered the ultimate disparagement: "The
statutes now resemble a patchwork mounted on patchwork, an
Ossa of confusion piled on a Pelion of disorder."3 5 For him, no
"system" of support remained. The Legislature had "frustrated"
the constitutional mandate.
D. The Nature and Allocation of Governmental Power
Justice Hopkins spoke in a consistent voice regarding the
nature and proper allocations of governmental powers to all
levels of government. He insisted that the inherent nature of
such powers and their allocation must be respected by each
branch at all times. He was both a student and practitioner of
governing who intuitively went back to first principles to resolve
issues involving the exercise of governmental power.
In the months immediately before retirement, in several sig-
nificant opinions, he had occasion to address the subject. His
dissenting opinion in Paerdegat Boat and Racquet Club, Inc. v.
Zarrelli36 was adopted by the court of appeals in reversing the
appellate division and confirming the long-standing principle
that public land is immune from a citizen's lien or attachment
regardless of the use to which the land is put at a particular
time.
Again, in Marcus v. Baron,37 his essay in dissent upon the
34. Id. at 267-68, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 873-74 (empahsis in original).
35. Id. at 269, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 875. The reference is to two mountains in Eastern
Greece in Thessaly.
36. 83 A.D.2d 444, 449, 445 N.Y.S.2d 162, 167 (2d Dep't 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 57 N.Y.2d 966, 443 N.E.2d 477, 457 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1982).
37. 84 A.D.2d 118, 134, 445 N.Y.S.2d 587, 598 (2d Dep't 1981) (Hopkins, J., dissent-
ing), rev'd, 57 N.Y.2d 862, 442 N.E.2d 437, 456 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1982).
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quantity and quality of powers delegated to muncipal govern-
ments by the Legislature was adopted as its own by the court of
appeals in reversing the appellate division and striking down a
town's attempt by local law to change the conditions enacted by
the Legislature for the creation of a village.3 8
Ten years earlier in Meyers v. New York State Division of
Housing & Community Renewal,39 he had written an authorita-
tive essay upon the nature and permissible scope of delegation
of discretionary powers by the Legislature, confirming the
nonreviewability by the courts of a local legislature's exercise of
discretion with respect to decontrol of rents.
E. The Institution and Process of Justice
Justice Hopkins' appreciation of the importance of the in-
stitution of the process by which justice is dispensed was proba-
bly nowhere more apparent than in his oft-cited opinion in Peo-
ple v. Clayton,4" where he sought to define the elements of what
came to be known as a "Clayton hearing." After tracing the his-
tory of the statutory provision for dismissals of criminal actions
38. Justice Hopkins' proclivity for providing the court of appeals with the basis for
decision in that court is well illustrated by the nine times in 1982 in which his majority,
concurring, dissenting, or concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion was cited as
the basis for affirming or reversing the appellate division's order. See Paerdegat Boat
and Racquet Club, Inc. v. Zarrelli, 57 N.Y.2d 966, 443 N.E.2d 477, 457 N.Y.S.2d 229
(1982), rev'g 83 A.D.2d 444, 445 N.Y.S.2d 162 (2d Dep't 1981) (per opinion of Hopkins,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Jamaica Water Supply
Co., 57 N.Y.2d 944, 443 N.E.2d 493, 457 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1982), af'g 83 A.D.2d 427, 444
N.Y.S.2d 925 (2d Dep't 1981) (per majority opinion of Hopkins, J.); Marcus v. Baron, 57
N.Y.2d 862, 442 N.E.2d 437, 456 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1982), rev'g 84 A.D.2d 118, 445 N.Y.S.2d
587 (2d Dep't 1981) (per opinion of Hopkins, J., dissenting); People v. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d
815, 441 N.E.2d 1118, 455 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1982), afl'g 82 A.D.2d 661, 442 N.Y.S.2d 803 (2d
Dep't 1981); Board of Educ. (Levittown) v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453
N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), modifying 83 A.D.2d 217, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1981) (in part
per opinion of Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); People v. Wil-
liams, 56 N.Y.2d 916, 438 N.E.2d 1126, 453 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1982), af'g 81 A.D.2d 418, 440
N.Y.S.2d 935 (2d Dep't 1981); People v. David L., 56 N.Y.2d 698, 436 N.E.2d 1324, 451
N.Y.S.2d 722 (1982) (mem.), rev'g 81 A.D.2d 893, 439 N.Y.S.2d 152 (2d Dep't 1981) (per
opinion of Hopkins, J., and Weinstein, J., dissenting); People v. West, 56 N.Y.2d 637, 436
N.E.2d 191, 450 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1982) (mem.), rev'g 84 A.D.2d 795, 449 N.Y.S.2d 439 (2d
Dep't 1981) (per opinion of Hopkins, J., dissenting); Kiley v. Coveney, 55 N.Y.2d 866,
433 N.E.2d 137, 448 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1982) (mem.), aff'g 84 A.D.2d 585, 443 N.Y.S.2d 736
(2d Dep't 1981).
39. 36 A.D.2d 166, 168-69, 319 N.Y.S.2d 522, 526-27 (2d Dep't 1971).
40. 41 A.D.2d 204, 342 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2d Dep't 1973).
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"in the interests of justice," he insisted that before a criminal
case could be dismissed on this ground there must be a system-
atic consideration of the relevant issues.41 Finding a void in the
law as to the factors to be considered, he undertook to fill that
void, which served that purpose until the Legislature in 1979
finally addressed the matter and provided guidelines for the ex-
ercise of the power to act "in the interests of justice. 42
He was a frequent writer not only on the role of procedure
in the effective discharge of justice, but on the place of the par-
ticular court on which he served in a modern judicial system. At
a time when the central role of intermediate appellate courts
was coming to be recognized nationwide, he was sharing his in-
sights as to how such a court functions, its significant responsi-
bility as the court of last resort for the great majority of cases
and the difficulties encountered in discharging that responsibil-
ity under the staggering caseloads in many jurisdictions.
In his article Small Sparks from a Low Fire: Some Reflec-
tions on the Appellate Process,43 he called attention to the need
for an authoritative answer "as to what constitutes a tolerable
case load for an appellate court."' 4 He proceeded to reflect upon
important issues of whether there should be a right of appeal in
all cases, the implications of the right to a speedy disposition,
the necessity for appellate court control over appeals, the special
aspects of appellate review in criminal cases, and the need for
streamlining the record on appeal.
Later, in 1975, he expressly set forth his conclusions as of
that time on the role of an intermediate appellate court.45 He
concluded that "a periodic reexamination of its role should be
instituted, particularly with respect to the kind of cases which it
should review, the need for additional judges, or the innovation
of other means of reducing the case load for the courts." ' His
41. People v. Clayton, 41 A.D.2d at 108, 342 N.Y.S. 2d at 110.
42. N.Y. CaiM. PROC. LAW § 210.40 (McKinney 1982), cf. id. § 170.40 (similar stan-
dards included).
43. Hopkins, Small Sparks from a Low Fire: Some Reflections on the Appellate
Process, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 551 (1972).
44. Id. at 551. Subsequently the question was considered in P. CARRINGTON, D. MEA-
DOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 144-46 (1976).
45. Hopkins, The Role of an Intermediate Appellate Court, 41 BROOKLYN L. FEv.
459 (1975).
46. Id. at 478.
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willingness to participate in the American Judicature Society's
appellate study in 1981 and 1982 was directly responsive to the
needs which he had identified and his contributions to that
study were of immense value.' 7
In reviewing the life in the law of Justice Hopkins one is led
to conclude that the stature, significance and role, not only of
his own court but of courts across the country, have been en-
hanced by the example and wise counsel of that compleat jurist.
Not only the bench but the entire profession is the richer for the
perspective James D. Hopkins has provided.
47. R. MACCRATZ, J. HOPKINS & M. ROSENBERG, APPELLATz JUSTICE IN NEW YORK
(1982).
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